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I. PLAINTIFFS’ SUIT SHOULD BE DISMISSED IN ITS ENTIRETY.
A. Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Not Justiciable.
1. Deferred action is a discretionary determination not to pursue removal
proceedings against an alien for a temporary period of time—a paradigmatic exercise
of prosecutorial discretion. Such a decision by an agency “not to exercise its
enforcement authority” is a core exercise of executive power that is presumptively not
subject to judicial review. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 828 (1985). Plaintiffs do
not dispute that a third party lacks standing “to contest the policies of the prosecuting
authority when he himself is neither prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution.”
Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973). Nor do plaintiffs dispute that
private persons “have no judicially cognizable interest in procuring enforcement of
the immigration laws.” Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 897 (1984). And
plaintiffs do not dispute that exercises of enforcement discretion regarding
immigration—where the removal authority is uniquely and exclusively federal and
may implicate foreign policy—are particularly ill-suited for judicial review. See Mathews
v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976).
These undisputed principles foreclose plaintiffs’ suit. States cannot establish a
justiciable claim by complaining that enforcement discretion has been exercised
regarding other persons. Whether brought by an individual or a State, such a
complaint amounts—at best—to a “generalized grievance” that does not give rise to a
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justiciable case or controversy. Henderson v. Stalder, 287 F.3d 374, 384 (5th Cir. 2002)
(Jones, J., concurring).
2. Plaintiffs attempt to circumvent these principles by arguing that the 2014
Guidance is not enforcement discretion but rather reviewable agency action because
deferred action confers “lawful presence, work authorization, and other benefits.” Br.
1, 13. But many other exercises of prosecutorial discretion have similarly significant
immigration or eligibility consequences. These collateral consequences do not render
the exercise of enforcement discretion reviewable. For example, the enforcement
decision to pursue certain types of criminal defendants through drug courts rather
than trials and incarceration allows defendants to obtain valuable benefits from the
government, such as intensive substance abuse treatment, mental health counseling,
and medical or therapeutic care. See, e.g., Tex. Gov’t Code 123.001-009. Similarly,
prosecutorial decisions to pursue misdemeanor rather than felony charges may allow
defendants to remain eligible for federally subsidized housing, see 42 U.S.C. 13661(c),
for certain occupation licenses, see Tex. Occ. Code 53.021, for government
contracting, see Federal Acquisition Regulation 9.406-2, or to possess a firearm, see 18
U.S.C. 922(g)(1). And choosing what criminal charges to pursue can have dramatic
immigration consequences because obtaining a conviction on certain charges, and not
prosecuting for an available aggravated felony or crime involving moral turpitude, can
allow the defendant to remain lawfully in the country rather than becoming subject to
removal. See 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A).
2

Case: 15-40238

Document: 00513047024

Page: 11

Date Filed: 05/18/2015

If an Executive decision to defer enforcement may be challenged—and, as
here, enjoined—whenever it results in collateral benefits for the non-prosecuted party,
all manner of exercises of prosecutorial discretion could become vulnerable to
litigation challenges. But Linda R.S., which itself involved a suit predicated on the
collateral consequence of a non-enforcement decision, forecloses this theory.
3. Moreover, even if plaintiffs only challenged the conferral of “benefits,” their
claims would remain nonjusticiable. Just as third parties generally lack standing to
challenge the exercise of prosecutorial discretion against another, third parties
generally lack standing to challenge the conferral of benefits upon another. See
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 346 (2006).
Plaintiffs assert that deferred action under the 2014 Guidance confers the
benefit of lawful presence on aliens. See Br. 20-21. To the extent plaintiffs complain
that an alien accorded deferred action can remain in the country during the period
that enforcement action is deferred, that simply reflects the nature of enforcement
discretion. Thus, plaintiffs challenge an inherent attribute of deferred action, not a
separate “benefit,” grant of lawful immigration status, or legal entitlement to remain
in the country. And to the extent plaintiffs refer to tolling of unlawful presence under
the INA’s entry and departure bars to admissibility, see 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(B) & (C),
they have not even alleged that lawful presence, as distinct from the decision to
accord deferred action, causes them harm. Plaintiffs have similarly failed to allege

3
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harm flowing from the possibility of advance parole or eligibility for Social Security,
Medicare, or the like. These are generalized grievances.
Plaintiffs also cannot evade the bar to judicial challenges of enforcement
discretion by pointing to the fact that deferred action makes an alien eligible to apply
for employment authorization, and that authorized employment may eventually
establish downstream eligibility for benefits such as Social Security and Medicare.
This Court has expressly held that the Secretary’s decision to approve an alien for
employment authorization “has been committed to agency discretion by law” and is
not subject to judicial review. Perales v. Casillas, 903 F.2d 1043, 1045 (5th Cir. 1990).
Thus, an attempt to challenge the approval of employment authorization for aliens
accorded deferred action would not be reviewable in its own right. It follows that the
possibility of an approval of employment authorization cannot provide the basis for
reviewing the exercise of deferred enforcement action.
B.

Plaintiffs Lack Article III Standing.
1. Texas’s Subsidization Of Driver’s Licenses Does Not Support Standing.

a. Having chosen to grant driver’s licenses to all aliens with employment
authorization and to subsidize those licenses, Texas cannot claim standing on the
ground that the 2014 Guidance will increase the number of aliens with employment
authorization and thereby increase the subsidy. Any costs to Texas are not fairly
traceable to the Guidance; they result from Texas’s own policy choices. The thenGovernor of Texas acknowledged this point shortly after the announcement of the
4
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2012 DACA guidelines. He explained that the Texas “legislature has passed laws that
reflect the policy choices that they believe are right for Texas” and that DACA “does
not undermine or change our state laws” or “change our obligations” to establish
eligibility for state benefits. ROA.4079. Presumably, Texas chooses to subsidize
driver’s licenses for aliens with employment authorization because it believes that is
the appropriate policy for Texas. If the State now believes otherwise, it can change its
laws accordingly.
In Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660 (1976), the Court held that
Pennsylvania lacked standing to challenge a New Jersey tax that triggered a tax credit
in Pennsylvania and thereby reduced Pennsylvania’s tax revenue. The Court explained
that any harm to Pennsylvania resulted from decisions of its own legislature and
“nothing prevents Pennsylvania from withdrawing that credit for taxes paid to New
Jersey.” Id. at 664. By the same token, Texas is free to change its driver’s licensing
policies in response to the 2014 Guidance. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 451
(1992), which held that Wyoming could challenge an Oklahoma law that “directly
affect[ed] Wyoming’s ability to collect severance tax revenues,” differs from cases like
Pennsylvania and this one where a State’s claimed injury is triggered by the plaintiff
State’s own law.
The federal government does not contend, as plaintiffs insist, that “any element
of choice” available to a plaintiff to avoid an injury defeats standing. Br. 27, 32.
Rather, standing cannot be predicated on an indirect, adverse consequence to a
5
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plaintiff of another party’s actions when the consequences are due to the plaintiff’s
own, independent policy choices. Far from “unprecedented,” Br. 29, this principle is
well accepted. See Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs & Trainmen v. Surface Transp. Bd., 457 F.3d
24, 30 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Petro-Chem Processing, Inc. v. EPA, 866 F.2d 433, 438 (D.C. Cir.
1989).
Plaintiffs suggest that because many States grant driver’s licenses to aliens with
federal employment authorization, the federal government’s broadening of the class
of aliens who may request deferred action—and thereby potentially become eligible
for employment authorization—impinges on state sovereignty. But, having chosen to
rely on a federal classification for providing a state benefit, a State cannot claim an
injury fairly traceable to the federal government whenever the federal government
alters the classification in a way that increases costs under state law. Most States, for
example, borrow the federal definition of “adjusted gross income” to compute state
income taxes. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. 43-1001(2). It is inconceivable that a State
could sue the federal government if the IRS issued a revenue ruling that lowered AGI
and thereby incidentally decreased state income-tax revenues. Moreover, in
Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court recognized that a State’s decision to change its laws
would avoid an injury rather than cause one. See 426 U.S. at 664.
Relying on Arizona DREAM Act Coalition v. Brewer (ADAC), 757 F.3d 1053,
1067 (9th Cir. 2014), plaintiffs assert that Texas may be unable to deny driver’s
licenses to aliens accorded deferred action. Br. 29. But—unlike Arizona in ADAC—
6
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Texas has not enacted a law to deny driver’s licenses to aliens accorded deferred
action, and it is entirely speculative whether Texas would enact such a law or what
form it might take. Given that there is no ripe controversy concerning preemption of
any law Texas might enact in the future, this Court should not entertain this suit,
where standing rests on speculation about whether Texas may change its state laws.
In any event, Texas is free to eliminate the subsidies about which it complains.
Texas could decline to subsidize the costs of all state driver’s licenses. Or it could
decline to subsidize the costs of its “temporary visitor” licenses, which include
licenses granted to DACA and DAPA recipients, on the ground that Texas will not
recoup the full benefits of subsidization from a temporary resident who lacks a longterm connection to the State. See Driver Licenses and ID Cards for Temporary
Visitors, https://www.txdps.state.tx.us/DriverLicense/limitedTerm. These options,
among various others, would not run afoul of federal preemption principles because
they rely on classifications “borrowed from federal law and further[ing] a substantial
state purpose.” ROA.1312. By contrast, in ADAC, Arizona identified no legitimate
purpose to support its refusal to issue driver’s licenses to DACA recipients. 757 F.3d
at 1067. Notably, Arizona did not invoke cost as a basis for denying licenses to
DACA recipients, and ADAC did not address state subsidies.
b. Plaintiffs’ argument also fails to account for the countervailing fiscal benefits
to States, including Texas, that will result from the 2014 Guidance. The benefits of
the Guidance—estimated at $338 million over five years in Texas alone, ROA.2473—
7
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will more than offset any estimated increase to the State in driver’s license costs.
Plaintiffs dismiss the financial benefits of the 2014 Guidance as “speculative”
and suggest that they have been exaggerated. Br. 37. But plaintiffs bear the burden of
establishing a concrete, non-speculative injury traceable to defendants, see Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 583 (1992), and they have failed to offer any reason
to doubt that the 2014 Guidance will lead to substantial financial benefits for States.
See Amicus Br. of State of Washington, et al. at 8-10; see also Inst. on Taxation &
Economic Policy, Undocumented Immigrants’ State & Local Tax Contributions 2 (April
2015) (econometric study estimating that DACA and DAPA would increase state and
local tax contributions “by an estimated $845 million a year once fully in place”).
Plaintiffs insist that the 2014 Guidance would cause Texas an Article III injury
even if it produces financial benefits that offset its costs. Br. 36. But Henderson, 287
F.3d at 379, provides that standing is lacking where benefits to the plaintiff from the
defendant’s conduct “offset [its] administrative costs.” Plaintiffs claim that Henderson
is limited to the “unique doctrine of taxpayer standing,” Br. 36, but nothing about
Henderson’s reasoning is confined to that setting. A plaintiff cannot be said to suffer
an economic injury from conduct that financially benefits it. The decisions cited by
plaintiffs generally involve benefits that otherwise accrue to a plaintiff from its
relationship with the defendant, not benefits that flow from the action being
challenged.
c. Plaintiffs’ attempt to establish an injury by relying on the incidental,
8
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downstream effects of federal immigration policies is boundless. If Texas can claim an
Article III injury based on its driver’s-license theory, States could likewise claim an
injury to enjoin approval of employment authorization for any alien on any basis. For
example, a State could challenge the federal government’s determination to grant
parole, asylum, or temporary protected status to citizens of a foreign country during a
crisis, so long as the State could establish a likelihood that some (or even one) of
those aliens would choose to reside in the State and apply for a driver’s license. Such
would contravene the federal government’s exclusive power over immigration, and
could interfere with sensitive foreign-policy and national-security judgments. See
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498 (2012); FAIR, Inc. v. Reno, 93 F.3d 897,
901 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (regional effects of U.S. agreement with Cuba to parole 20,000
Cubans annually were not within INA zone of interests). Taken to its logical
conclusion, this theory could permit States to challenge any federal action or policy if
it might have the incidental consequence of prompting an individual to move to a
State or triggering a service provided by state law. Such a boundless theory of
standing would transform the federal courts into a venue for political disputes rather
than concrete cases or controversies.
2. Plaintiffs’ Educational and Law Enforcement Expenditures Do Not Support
Standing.
This Court’s decision in Texas v. United States, 106 F.3d 661, 666 (5th Cir. 1997),
forecloses Plaintiffs’ claim that they have standing on the theory that the 2014
9
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Guidance will cause them to incur increased law-enforcement and social-services
expenses. Texas held that state costs associated with providing educational, medical,
and penal services to unlawfully present aliens are not attributable to the federal
government’s enforcement policies. In the course of rejecting a Tenth Amendment
claim, the Court made clear that costs of providing services to aliens result from the
States’ own laws and their duties under the Constitution, not federal immigration
policies. See id.
Plaintiffs’ claimed injury from such costs also fails factually. Plaintiffs cannot
establish that the 2014 Guidance will attract new aliens to their States. The district
court correctly found that magnet theory “too attenuated” to confer standing.
ROA.4431. Plaintiffs have not shown, and offer no reason to believe, that new
immigrants will unlawfully enter the United States because of policies from which newly
arrived aliens are expressly excluded. And the hypothetical possibility that some aliens
might misunderstand the 2014 Guidance and immigrate illegally based on that
misunderstanding is not fairly traceable to defendants.
Nor can it be assumed the 2014 Guidance will lead to an increased number of
aliens in the plaintiff States by causing DHS to remove fewer aliens. Because the
Guidance is intended to help DHS focus its limited resources on protecting the
border and removing aliens most likely to commit crimes, the Guidance will make
DHS enforcement more effective, not less. And the reallocation of DHS resources
will facilitate the removal of immigrants that impose a greater financial burden on the
10
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States. Cf. Crane v. Johnson, 783 F.3d 244, 252 (5th Cir. 2015). Even assuming that the
2014 Guidance will cause some aliens not to leave the country, the States make no
showing that the costs associated with any such aliens will outweigh the substantial
savings that will result from DHS’s enhanced focus on border security and public
safety.
3. Plaintiffs Cannot Assert Parens Patriae Standing Against the Federal Government.
As explained in the federal government’s opening brief, a “State does not have
standing as parens patriae to bring an action against the Federal Government” on behalf
of its residents. Alfred L. Snapp & Son v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 610
n.16 (1982); see also Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485-86 (1923). Plaintiffs
concede they lack standing to bring suit to protect their residents from federal law, but
contend they may bring suit on their residents’ behalf to force the federal government
to comply with (their view of) federal law. Br. 37. That is a distinction without a
difference. In any event, plaintiffs’ theory assumes that employers will violate federal
law (see 29 U.S.C. 218c(a)(1); 8 U.S.C. 1324b(a)) by discriminating against residents of
their States who are U.S. citizens receiving tax credits under the Affordable Care Act
in favor of aliens accorded deferred action who are not eligible for tax credits. Courts
refuse to “presume illegal activities on the part of actors not before the court” in
order to find standing. Tel. and Data Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 19 F.3d 42, 48 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
C. Plaintiffs Have No Cause Of Action.
Plaintiffs seek relief under the APA, but the APA’s cause of action, 5 U.S.C.
11
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702(a), is unavailable if the “plaintiff’s interests are so marginally related to or
inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be
assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit,” Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S.
388, 399 (1987), or if the relevant statute expressly or impliedly precludes judicial
review, Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 345-52 (1984).
1. Plaintiffs’ interests here are not within the zone of interests of the INA
(including the unauthorized employment statute, 8 U.S.C. 1324a) and thus plaintiffs
have no cause of action. FAIR, 93 F.3d at 901; Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control
Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1387 (2014). Plaintiffs suggest that anyone who
would comment is within the zone of interests of the rulemaking provisions of the
APA. But “Congress, in adopting the APA, had no such universal standing in mind.”
Capital Legal Found. v. Commodity Credit Corp., 711 F.2d 253, 260 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
Rather, a plaintiff asserting a violation of the APA’s notice-and-comment
requirements must demonstrate that he comes within the zone of interests protected
by the underlying substantive statute the challenged rule implements. Mendoza v. Perez,
754 F.3d 1002, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 2014); cf. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573 n.8.
Plaintiffs cannot bring themselves within the zone of interests of the INA by
focusing on benefits they claim will accrue to aliens accorded deferred action. A
third-party does not generally have a protected interest in whether someone else is
awarded benefits. See DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 338. Here, most of what plaintiffs
list as benefits are programs funded by the federal government, not the States. And
12
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even if plaintiffs could identify a direct interest in an alien’s eligibility for such
programs, they can point to nothing in the INA that purports to afford States a right
to challenge determinations by the Secretary that might affect such eligibility.
The financial consequences cited by plaintiffs are not part of deferred action,
but are potential consequences of the Secretary’s decision to approve employment
authorization. Plaintiffs’ interests in not subsidizing driver’s licenses for those
accorded deferred action are far outside any zone of interests of the employment
authorization statute, 8 U.S.C. 1324a(h)(3), even assuming a third party could ever
challenge an approval of employment authorization under this provision. Texas’s
driver’s-license subsidies are tied to employment authorization solely because of
Texas’s own choice. As noted above, this Court held in Perales that employment
authorization decisions are committed to the Secretary’s discretion by law. And the
INA broadly prohibits review of decisions committed to the Secretary’s discretion by
statute. 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).
The importance of federal immigration policies to States does not mean that
Congress intended to authorize States to challenge those policies in court. Federal
decisions whether to admit aliens into the United States or to permit them to remain
have important consequences for the Nation as a whole, including the Nation’s
foreign affairs. That is precisely why the “responsibility for regulating the relationship
between the United States and our alien visitors has been committed to the political
branches of the Federal Government.” Mathews, 426 U.S. at 81. State suits seeking to
13
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overturn federal immigration policies invite judicial intrusion into matters committed
to Congress and the discretion of the Executive Branch. As is illustrated by the sharp
divisions between the plaintiff States and the non-party amicus States that support
implementation of the 2014 Guidance, such suits place courts in the position of
adjudicating disagreements over national immigration policy. And they pose a
substantial risk of interfering with the United States’ ability to speak with one voice on
matters that “may affect trade, investment, tourism, and diplomatic relations for the
entire Nation.” Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2498; cf. Arpaio v. Obama, 27 F. Supp. 3d 185, 191
(D.D.C. 2014), appeal pending, No. 14-5325 (D.C. Cir.) (argued May 4, 2015),.
2. The INA reinforces the Heckler v. Chaney principle that decisions about
whether to undertake enforcement action are presumptively committed to the
relevant agency’s discretion and not subject to judicial review. The INA expressly
provides that “no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on
behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the [Secretary] to commence
proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.” 8 U.S.C. 1252(g). This
provision is “aimed at protecting the Executive’s discretion from the courts” by
precluding “attempts to impose judicial constraints upon prosecutorial discretion.”
Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti- Discrimination Comm. (AAADC), 525 U.S. 471, 485-86 & n.9
(1999).
Plaintiffs argue that section 1252(g) applies to bar suits only by aliens, and that
congressional intent to preclude review at the behest of States or other third parties
14
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cannot be implied in light of the general presumption of judicial review. Br. at 40.
But “[t]he presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action is just that—a
presumption.” Block, 467 U.S. at 349; Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 190 (1993). It can
be rebutted by clear indications that Congress intended to foreclose review. Mach
Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 135 S. Ct. 1645, 1651 (2015); Block, 467 U.S. at 351; United
States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 446-49 (1988).
Here, the INA expressly precludes suit by the parties subject to an enforcement
action. It contains no provision expressly authorizing suit by States or any other third
party. It operates in an area—the exercise of enforcement discretion—that is
presumptively unreviewable and that the Constitution commits to the Executive
Branch. And it concerns decisions that are suffused with broad administrative
discretion at every stage. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2499. Nothing in the text or structure
of the INA suggests a congressional intent to permit States to intrude into this area.
II.

PLAINTIFFS HAVE NOT DEMONSTRATED A LIKELIHOOD
OF SUCCESS ON THE MERITS.

A.

The Secretary’s 2014 Guidance Is Exempt From Notice-andComment Rulemaking.
Plaintiffs’ contention that the 2014 Guidance must be promulgated through

notice-and-comment rulemaking mischaracterizes its terms, purpose, and practical
application. The 2014 Guidance establishes guidelines for the discretionary exercise
of the Secretary’s power to determine whether to pursue removal of an alien from the
United States. Such guidelines for the allocation and focus of an agency’s enforce15
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ment resources are not legislative rules and thus are not subject to notice-andcomment rulemaking. Dep’t of Labor v. Kast Metals Corp., 744 F.2d 1145, 1152 n.13 (5th
Cir. 1984); American Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
1. Plaintiffs argue that the 2014 Guidance establishes a new program awarding
aliens new legal rights and entitlements, and claim that it therefore must comply with
the notice-and comment requirements of the APA. This characterization of the
Guidance is wrong, and even if it were correct, it would not support plaintiffs’ claim.
The 2014 Guidance does not grant government benefits to aliens. An alien
accorded deferred action is not thereby entitled to a check for Social Security benefits
or a Medicare card for hospital insurance. Deferred action enables an alien to apply
for employment authorization, and if authorization is obtained, to seek lawful
employment, pay taxes, and accrue lawful income and employment history needed to
eventually qualify for such benefits. But employment authorization for aliens
accorded deferred action is expressly authorized by a 1981 regulation that was
promulgated through notice and comment rulemaking. See 8 C.F.R. 274a.12(c)(14).
Although lawful employment is a necessary step in establishing eligibility for Social
Security and other benefits, the 2014 Guidance, unlike the agency action at issue in
Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974), does not establish eligibility criteria for such
programs. Rather, eligibility turns on numerous other requirements established by
and peculiar to each program under preexisting laws and regulations.

16
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Although aliens accorded deferred action are lawfully present for a certain
period in the sense that the government has determined not to seek their removal
during the term of deferred action, that is very different from a grant of lawful
immigration status or legal entitlement to remain in the United States. That
distinction is nothing new to immigration law. “Unlawful presence and unlawful
status are distinct concepts” and “[i]t is entirely possible for aliens to be lawfully
present (i.e., in a ‘period of stay authorized by the Attorney General’) even though
their lawful status has expired.” Chaudhry v. Holder, 705 F.3d 289, 292 (7th Cir. 2013).
Numerous categories of aliens who are considered to have lawful presence, including
all aliens accorded deferred action, are nonetheless not in lawful status. 5 Gordon,
Mailer, & Yale-Loehr, Immigration Law and Procedure 63.10[c][2], at 63-129 (2014)
Deferred action does not cure or excuse prior immigration law violations, render the
alien lawfully admitted, or afford the alien lawful immigration status.1
1

The Secretary has statutory authority to grant advance parole to any alien applying
for admission (other than a refugee) for “urgent humanitarian reasons or significant
public benefit,” allowing the alien to leave and reenter the country. 8 U.S.C.
1182(d)(5)(A); 8 C.F.R. 212.5(f). An alien who leaves and returns to the United
States under a grant of advance parole is not making a departure under the
immigration laws and hence does not trigger the three- or ten-year bars to
admissibility that may apply. See ROA 496-498; 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(B); see also 8
U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(B)(v) (allowing the Secretary to waive the bar for qualifying aliens
based on extreme hardship). For aliens who previously entered the United States
unlawfully and who now qualify for an immigrant visa under the INA, parole would
remove one impediment to applying for that visa through “adjustment of status” in
the United States (rather than consular processing overseas), because the alien would
have been “inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States.” 8 U.S.C.
1255(a)(1). Deferred action does not entitle an alien to advance parole, and neither
17

Case: 15-40238

Document: 00513047024

Page: 26

Date Filed: 05/18/2015

Furthermore, even if the 2014 Guidance did confer Social Security or similar
benefits on aliens (which it does not), that would not render it subject to notice-andcomment requirements. To the contrary, the APA expressly exempts from noticeand-comment rulemaking matters relating to “benefits” and “grants.” 5 U.S.C.
553(a)(2). This exception is not, as plaintiffs contend, Br. 42, limited to “public
benefits” or benefits in which the government has a proprietary interest. The plain
language does not contain such limitation, and the construction urged by plaintiffs
was rejected long ago by the D.C. Circuit. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Snow, 561 F.2d 227,
231-32 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
Finally, the Secretary did not need to issue the 2014 Guidance to establish legal
authority to defer removals. As plaintiffs acknowledge, one indicium of whether a
rule establishes new substantive rights or obligations (and thus amounts to a legislative
rule subject to notice-and comment) is whether the agency would have legal authority
to undertake the relevant action without first promulgating an enabling rule. Br. 43
(citing Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1112 (D.C. Cir.
1993)). Deferred action is a practice reflected in longstanding regulations, see 8 C.F.R.
274a.12(c)(14), and recognized by the Supreme Court as an appropriate exercise of the
Executive’s removal discretion. See AAADC, 525 U.S. at 483-84; see also Matter of
Quintero, 18 I. & N. Dec. 348, 350 (B.I.A. 1982) (“the prosecutorial discretion
deferred action nor advance parole creates any entitlement to lawful immigration
status or an immigrant visa.
18
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exercised in granting deferred action status is committed exclusively to the Service
enforcement officials”). The legal authority to defer removal action thus exists
without the 2014 Guidance.
2. Plaintiffs argue that even if the 2014 Guidance is properly understood as a
general policy for exercise of enforcement discretion, it is still a legislative rule subject
to notice and comment because it allows no discretion and establishes final
constraints on the Secretary’s enforcement decisions. Br. 45-46. This contention is
inconsistent with Circuit precedent and unsupported by the record below.
a. In Crane, 783 F.3d at 254-55, this Court held that the 2014 Guidance does not
preclude the agency’s exercise of enforcement discretion. It reasoned that the 2014
Guidance makes clear that immigration officials retain discretion to institute or defer a
removal action on the basis of a case-by-case evaluation of an alien’s individual
circumstances. That discretion makes the 2014 Guidance a quintessential statement
of policy exempt from notice and comment.
Plaintiffs assert that Crane is inconsistent with the evidentiary record here and
therefore is not binding. Br. 24-25. But whether the 2014 Guidance vests
immigration officers with case-by-case discretion is largely, if not exclusively, a legal
issue rather than a factual one, and Crane establishes the law of the Circuit on this
point. Moreover, the “new” evidence on which plaintiffs and the district court rely
pertains to implementation of the 2012 DACA policy, not the 2014 Guidance
challenged here. And in any event, the record here demonstrates that requests for
19
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deferred action under the 2012 DACA policy were denied for discretionary reasons.
See ROA.4146-4149. The district court in Arpaio, 27 F. Supp. 3d at 193-94, citing
similar evidence, concluded that discretionary, case-by-case review is permitted and
does occur under the 2012 DACA policy. And although a high proportion of
deferred action requests under that policy have been approved, that merely reflects
what logic and common sense would predict—that aliens whose circumstances weigh
against deferred action are unlikely to identify themselves to DHS by requesting
deferred action in the first instance.
b. Even if the 2014 Guidance were deemed to impose significant constraints
on agency discretion, that would not suffice to make it a legislative rule requiring
notice and comment. Legislative rules are those that have a significant effect on the
legal rights or obligations of third parties. Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715
F.2d 897, 908 (5th Cir. 1983). Contrary to plaintiffs’ contentions, “agency instructions
to agency officers are not legislative rules.” Kast , 744 F.2d at 1152 n.13. Thus, the
key question is not whether instructions to agency officials and subordinates are firm
or “tentative,” but whether the instructions establish binding norms that regulate the
prospective conduct of third parties. The 2014 Guidance merely sets forth internal
guidelines for the exercise of a discretionary enforcement power. Such guidelines are
not legislative rules. Id. at 1155; Bowen, 834 F.2d at 1050.

20
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B. The 2014 Guidance Is Consistent With The Secretary’s Statutory
And Constitutional Authority.
Plaintiffs assert they are likely to succeed on two additional claims on which the
district court did not rely—first, that the 2014 Guidance exceeds the Secretary’s
statutory authority, and second, that it violates separation-of-powers principles.
Neither claim supports the preliminary injunction.
1. Deferred Action Under The 2014 Guidance Is Consistent With The INA.
The Secretary’s authority to defer removal of aliens is consistent with
longstanding practice, Supreme Court precedent, and statutes expressly vesting the
Secretary with broad discretion to set policies for use of agency resources in enforcing
the immigration laws. In AAADC, the Supreme Court stated that “[a]t each stage [of
the deportation process] the Executive has discretion to abandon the endeavor,” and
noted that immigration officials “had been engaging in a regular practice (which has
come to be known as ‘deferred action’) of exercising that discretion for humanitarian
reasons or simply for its own convenience.” 525 U.S. at 483-84. The Court recently
confirmed that “[a] principal feature of the removal system is the broad discretion
exercised by immigration officials” and that “[f]ederal officials, as an initial matter,
must decide whether it makes sense to pursue removal at all.” Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at
2499.
Plaintiffs attempt to evade this controlling precedent by mischaracterizing
deferred action under the 2014 Guidance as an affirmative grant of lawful presence
21
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rather than an exercise of enforcement discretion. But every decision to defer
removal entails an official determination to countenance the alien’s continued
presence in the United States unless and until a decision to institute removal
proceeding is made or deferral is revoked. Plaintiffs’ contention that such action
constitutes an impermissible grant of a new immigration status runs contrary to
AAADC and Arizona as well as longstanding practice. See p.17, supra.
Plaintiffs also assert that the scale of the 2014 Guidance renders it qualitatively
distinct from prior exercises of enforcement discretion. But the number of aliens
potentially eligible to request deferred action under the 2014 Guidance does not make
it any less a permissible exercise of enforcement discretion. In the Family Fairness
program adopted in 1990, the Executive made similar opportunities available to what
was estimated to be 1.5 million aliens who were not lawfully present.2 See ROA.506.
The 2014 Guidance is rooted in the same considerations of enforcement priorities,
resource constraints, and humanitarian considerations as prior exercises of deferred
action, and the Supreme Court has recognized that such determinations are within the
Secretary’s statutory authority. See AAADC, 525 U.S. at 483-84.
2. The Secretary Has Broad Discretion To Authorize Employment Of Aliens.
As noted above, this Court held in Perales that the Secretary’s determinations
whether to approve employment authorization for aliens are committed to his
2

Plaintiffs argue that “only” 47,000 people actually received relief under the Family
Fairness program. More than 1.4 million additional aliens, however, were estimated
to be eligible for relief but did not apply. See ROA.506.
22
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discretion by law. 903 F.2d at 1045. Perales is premised on statutory provisions that
expressly recognize the Secretary’s (formerly the Attorney General’s) authority to
authorize an alien to work lawfully. See 8 U.S.C. 1324a(h)(3). It is also consistent
with regulations specifically permitting the approval of employment authorization for
aliens accorded deferred action. 8 C.F.R. 274a.12(c)(14). Plaintiffs attempt to
distinguish Perales by arguing it is limited to the denial rather than approval of
employment authorization. Br. 49. But this Court expressly held that “the agency’s
decision to grant voluntary departure and work authorization has been committed to
agency discretion by law.” Perales, 903 F.2d at 1045 (emphasis added). That holding
controls here.
3. The 2014 Guidance Is Consistent With The Constitution.
In a single paragraph, plaintiffs summarily assert that the 2014 Guidance is
“incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress” and violates
separation-of-powers principles. Br. 50 (quotation marks omitted). This passing
assertion does not suffice to preserve an argument for appellate review. Yohey v.
Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1993). In any event, plaintiffs’ constitutional
assertion is nothing more than a recapitulation of their statutory argument, and as
explained above, that statutory argument is without merit.
Several of plaintiffs’ amici attempt to make up for plaintiffs’ failure to press a
constitutional challenge. But “[i]t is well settled in this Circuit that an amicus curiae
generally cannot expand the scope of an appeal to implicate issues that have not been
23
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presented by the parties to the appeal.” Garcia-Melendez v. Ashcroft, 351 F.3d 657, 662
n.2 (5th Cir. 2003) (quotation marks omitted). And even if the constitutional
arguments of the amici were properly before the Court, they are without merit.
In particular, the amici err in asserting that the 2014 Guidance violates the
President’s constitutional responsibility to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed.” This contention rests on a false dichotomy between enforcement
discretion and the Take Care Clause. “The power to decide when to investigate, and
when to prosecute, lies at the core of the Executive’s duty to see to the faithful
execution of the laws . . . .” Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Pierce, 786 F.2d 1199,
1201 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (emphasis added); accord United States v. Hayes, 589 F.2d 811, 819
n.3 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965) (en banc).
Thus, enforcement discretion is an integral part of the Take Care duty, not a violation
of it.
III.

THE BALANCE OF HARMS FAVORS REVERSAL OF THE
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION.

As discussed above, plaintiffs have not demonstrated that they will suffer
concrete and cognizable harm as a result of the 2014 Guidance, much less irreparable
harm. By contrast, the preliminary injunction injures the federal government and
undermines the public interest in a manner that will not be redressable if and when
the Guidance is upheld.
The injunction impedes implementation of a policy that protects homeland and
24
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national security by encouraging aliens who are low priorities for removal to identify
themselves, undergo a background check, and consent to inclusion in a DHS database
so that immigration officers in the field may quickly identify these aliens. Plaintiffs
contend that these same objectives could be accomplished through other, unspecified
policies. Br. 52. But the Secretary has determined that policy embodied in the 2014
Guidance will best advance the public-safety and border-security priorities established
by Congress. Plaintiffs can hardly ask the Court to resolve this case by rejecting the
Secretary’s expert judgment in favor of their own.
The injunction also undermines police efforts by discouraging aliens from
cooperating with law enforcement. See Amicus Br. of Major Cities Chiefs Ass’n, et al.
at 5-10. And it deprives non-party States of significant tax revenues and undermines
important humanitarian concerns. See Amicus Br. of State of Wash., et al. at 3-13.
Moreover, as explained in the federal government’s opening brief, the
injunction has resulted in intractable administrative burdens. Plaintiffs dismiss this
harm as “manufactured” and suggest that the government should have ceased its
implementation efforts when Texas announced it would bring suit. Br. 53. But a
defendant is under no duty to enjoin itself as soon as a plaintiff seeks an injunction,
and ceasing preparatory efforts would have made timely implementation of the policy
impossible in the event no injunction issued.
Finally, the preliminary injunction imposes the sort of structural harm to the
federal government that has been deemed irreparable in circumstances strikingly
25
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similar to those presented here. In INS v. Legalization Assistance Project, 510 U.S. 1301
(1993), Circuit Justice O’Connor granted the federal government a stay where a
district court had issued an injunction interfering with the government’s execution of
the Immigration Reform and Control Act. Justice O’Connor explained that the
injunction was “not merely an erroneous adjudication of a lawsuit between private
litigants, but an improper intrusion by a federal court into the workings of a
coordinate branch of the Government.” Id. at 1306. It thus presented “an
exceptional case” in which a stay was proper. Id. at 1302. Here too, the district
court’s preliminary injunction constitutes an extraordinary and erroneous intrusion
into the workings of the Executive Branch.
IV. THE NATIONWIDE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IS
OVERBROAD.
Plaintiffs offer no plausible justification for a nationwide injunction that
unnecessarily harms non-party States who actively support the challenged Executive
policies. Contrary to plaintiffs’ assertion, this objection has not been waived. The
federal government opposed a preliminary injunction and objected to its nationwide
scope in seeking a stay pending appeal as soon as it became clear the district court had
exceeded its equitable authority.
Plaintiffs cite National Mining Association v. Army Corps of Engineers, 145 F.3d
1399 (D.C. Cir. 1998), and Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484 (D.C. Cir. 1989), for
the proposition that a single district court must issue nationwide relief when it
26
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determines that a regulation is facially invalid. But Harmon’s discussion of this point is
dicta. See id. at 496 n.23 And National Mining involved a suit by trade association
plaintiffs representing many of the regulated parties, a final determination that the
challenged regulation was invalid rather than preliminary injunctive relief, and factors
that could be applicable only to decisions by the D.C. Circuit. See 145 F.3d at 140910. None of these considerations is present here.
In the absence of a certified nationwide class, the interests in uniform
application of the immigration laws do not empower a single district court to dictate
immigration policy for the entire country. While uniform application of immigration
laws is important, that principle weighs against entering an injunction at all; it does not
empower the district court to exceed established limits on equitable relief, override
interests of non-party States supporting the 2014 Guidance, or arrogate to itself the
authority to decide nationwide immigration policy.
Finally, the notion that the 2014 Guidance must be enjoined throughout the
nation to save Texas its putative costs of issuing driver’s licenses to aliens residing
within its borders is untenable. Texas could unilaterally eliminate these harms simply
by charging full price for its licenses. A declaratory judgment would also give Texas a
basis to deny driver’s licenses under state law, without interfering with the Secretary’s
discretion under federal law. An injunction could be tailored to remedy Texas’s
claimed harm by enjoining deferred action for aliens who live in Texas.
While it is conceivable that aliens accorded deferred action in other jurisdic27
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tions may move to Texas, those costs are speculative and apt to be small. More
important, they do not warrant divesting other non-party States of the millions of
dollars they believe will flow from the 2014 Guidance. An injunction is an equitable
remedy and so the court is required to consider interests of all affected parties,
including parties not before the court and the public interest as a whole.
CONCLUSION
This Court should vacate the order below and remand with instructions to
dismiss the case or, in the alternative, should reverse the preliminary injunction or, at
a minimum, limit its geographic scope.
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